—141→
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Counterfeit Chains of Discourse: A Comparison
of Citation in Cervantes'
Casamiento / Coloquio and in Islamic
Hadith
University of Wisconsin-Madison
(No me acuerdo, cómo podría acordarme de ese diálogo. Pero fue así, lo escribo escuchándolo, o lo invento copiándolo, o lo copio inventándolo. Preguntarse de paso si no será eso la literatura). |
JULIO CORTÁZAR, «Diario para un cuento»1 |
Rarely in western literature has discourse within discourse -and about discourse- resulted in such complexity as in Cervantes' double novela, El casamiento engañoso and El coloquio de los perros.2 Speaking voices imitate other voices which imitate yet others, invisible hands transcribe or compose diaphanous layers of words, and at every level receptive minds question and reshape these words. While all literary discourse may be considered citation, as Graciela Reyes has maintained (9, 14, 34), in a very literal sense citation generates the —142→ double novela in nearly all its various processes of speech and writing; outside of citation, only the barest narrative frame remains, and even this could be considered a sort of anonymous citation on the part of the writer. The Coloquio, in fact, is in its entirety a citation of the Casamiento. This essay focuses on different aspects of citation in the Casamiento / Coloquio -citation being understood as the explicit or implicit attribution of words to someone regardless of whether those words are actually repeated, altered somehow or invented. My aim is to sketch out the workings of citation theoretically in the Casamiento / Coloquio. Like Don Quixote, the Casamiento / Coloquio is one of those exceptional texts that provide extreme and sometimes bizarre examples of widespread novelistic practices, and thus invite theoretical inquiry on their own grounds.
I am especially interested in what happens to language which, when quoted, becomes something quite other than what it was. This certainly happens when it passes from one sort of discourse to another, from one character type to another, one worldview or set of values to another, one ontological status to another, one set of circumstances to another, and so forth. In such cases words come to take on a markedly different significance and orientation every time they are quoted. When this occurs repeatedly, the ever-expanding transmission itself elaborates on its own true or fictive history of intermediate transmissive events and their various contexts; cited language thus becomes densely populated with recognizable faces, as it were. I shall characterize citation as a complex process composed of the simultaneous enactment and displaced reenactments of many communicative events. The very fact that such citation is differential, dialogic, «otherizing», implies an active relationship between citing and cited discourses. In the Casamiento / Coloquio, discursive interaction brings about a refraction of value and viewpoint and a consequent loss of discursive authority on the part of most participants.
In order to bring novelistic citation into relief, I shall
contrast it with multiple citation in a radically different body of texts, the
Islamic
, or «traditions»3. Because the
, associated with the sacred, were popularly
transmitted, it became increasingly important in the early years of Islam to
protect them from alteration and forgery. Means were devised to isolate cited
discourse from both discursive and
—143→
circumstantial context and
thereby -at best- preserve its integral authority over centuries. In many ways
the
are poles apart from Cervantes'
novela with respect to citation.
Nowhere in the Casamiento / Coloquio do strata of citation run deeper than when la Camacha, a sorceress, utters a divination concerning the fate of two puppies to which her fellow sorceress la Montiela has given birth:
|
La Montiela transcribes and memorizes these lines and somehow passes them on to a third witch, la Cañizares,5 who in turn cites them in a much longer discourse spoken to the dog Berganza, whom she identifies as one of her friend's litter. Much later Berganza quotes Cañizares' monologue at great length as he narrates his life story to his canine companion Cipión, who repeats the divination and subjects it to a skeptical critique. A delirious ensign named Campuzano, for his part, claims to have overheard the dogs' dialogue and to have transcribed it faithfully while recovering from syphilis at the Hospital de la Resurrección. His friend Peralta, after hearing Campuzano's own account of events leading to the illness (the subject of the —144→ Casamiento) reads the manuscript of the Coloquio as fiction. All of this is conveyed by a nameless narrator, and the narration as a whole is of course Cervantes' written text. The poetic lines are thus produced and reproduced in many discursive events occurring in different times and places and on different ontological planes. Yet they only appear twice in the text we read, once within Berganza' s life story told to Cipión and the other time as Cipión's citation of them back to Berganza in the same dialogue.
Significantly, maximum depth of citation corresponds exactly to the crucial importance of the prophecy within the Coloquio. Berganza anticipates the prophecy several times as a possible key to the mystery of the dogs' origin and sudden powers of speech. Cipión singles it out for exegesis and rejection. La Cañizares (like Berganza) centers her discourse on it. La Montiela dies of grief upon hearing it along with la Camacha's confession of having performed the malicious sorcery. And la Camacha utters the divination on her own deathbed.6 Vital interests and discursive interests coincide to produce multiple citation.
The following discursive levels are active precisely when the divination appears for the second time in the novela:
LEVEL | WRITER / SPEAKER | TEXT / UTTERANCE | READER / LISTENER | MEDIUM | MODE |
Ia | Cervantes (as novelist) | Casamiento / Coloquio (as novelas) | reader(s) | written | fictive/ novelistic |
Ib | narrator | Casamiento
/ Coloquio (as historias) | narratee(s) | quasi-oral | narrative
informative |
IIa | Campuzano («novelist») | Coloquio (as novela) | Peralta | written | fictive / novelistic |
IIb | Campuzano (transriber) |
Coloquio (as transcription) | narratee(s) (fictive) | written | transcriptive |
III | Cipión | critical interruption | Berganza / (Campuzano) | oral | analytic / evaluative |
IV | Berganza | life story | Cipión / (Campuzano) | oral | narrative / informative |
V | Cañizares | birth of dogs
/ witchcraft, etc. | Berganza | oral | narrative / informative |
VI | Montiela | divination | Cañizares | written / also oral? | transcriptive |
VII | Camacha | divination | Montiela | oral | prophetic |
One should bear in mind, firstly, that this artificial scheme, whose «levels» are really communicative events and their reenactment, corresponds to only one moment in the text. (I use the term «level» merely for lack of an appropriate word; there are no «levels» as such in discourse.) Just before and after Cipión quotes the divination (III), levels IV through VII disappear entirely. When Berganza utters the prophecy (IV), in contrast, all levels except number III of the above scheme are simultaneously active; just before and after his citation of the prophecy, all but levels III, VI and VII are active. Given such mutability from one moment to the next, it would be pointless to try to establish a «discursive structure» for the double novela as a whole without taking temporality into account.7 Outside the text the number of levels is likewise unstable, because if I quote or misquote la Camacha' s divination and someone else reads or listens to this, or if we discover that the divination is itself a quotation of some extratextual source -la Camacha, after all, was tried and sentenced by the Inquisition for sorcery before Cervantes made her (or rather her legend formed by decades of citation) into a novelistic character- more levels can be added indefinitely.
Secondly, I have arbitrarily chosen to subdivide levels I and II, since both involve author / narrator and reader / narratee (and thus also invention / transmission) distinctions that are clearly of a different order from the relationship between any consecutive «levels» as such. In levels VII through IIb -to follow the order of events- one character says or writes something that is heard or overheard or read by another character, who in turn cites part or all of this some time later in his or her own discourse, and so on; the result is a chain of verbal transmission from one character to another. The knowledge of an «omniscient» narrator unites levels I and II, embracing the entire narration and all levels of citation.
Thirdly, level III is clearly anomalous because what Cipión says would normally be located at the same level as what Berganza says, both dogs being engaged in a dialogue that is overheard by Campuzano, but here he quotes his companion, and thus a level momentarily interposes itself between Berganza's speech and —146→ Campuzano's transcription of it. Whereas swallowing another's discourse more or less whole is the norm in levels VII through IIb, Cipión at level III does not include Berganza' s life story in his discourse but rather interrupts that story to quote and comment upon a fragment of it.
In terms of the reconstructed order of discursive events rather than the novela's actual unfolding, an «ascending» chain of transmission is thus established with no fewer than six links (VII to IIb before level IIa reveals the entire discursive chain «below» it to be as counterfeit as the fake gold chain Campuzano used to deceive other characters in the Casamiento engañoso (290-91). What such discourse loses in authenticity it more than makes up for by the artistry that has gone into its «forgery». Such, at least, is the opinion of Peralta, who reads as fictive a manuscript presented to him as factually true, praising its «invención» (359). Moreover, Campuzano's discursive counterfeiting itself turns out to be counterfeit within Cervantes' fiction. The prophecy's transmission moves forwards in time through disparate communicative events, while those events are doubly invented, projected backwards into a putative past that is made for them.
The cited prophecy undoubtedly figures among the most resonant moments in all of Western literature. John Barth, in his study «Tales within Tales within Tales», finds no Western text with more than five discursive levels, that is, levels of citing and cited discourses active at any one moment in the text. Cervantes, with his multi-discursive finale to the Novelas ejemplares, could well be inviting his readers to take part in a profound literary game, one that reveals some of the secrets of fiction-making.
The study of verbal transmission / invention has led me rather far
afield to a cursory comparative survey of identical issues in very different
texts, the Islamic
, which reported the sayings and actions of
the Prophet Muhammad in chains of communicative events extending across the
first few centuries of Islam. Much can in fact be learned from the rigorous
discipline that began to emerge in the 2nd century A. H. (8th century A. D.)
out of the need to distinguish true or reliable
from false or «weak» ones among
the many thousands extant at the time. Such distinctions were essential because
the reported sayings of the Prophet had, for the mainstream Sunni Muslims, become the most important source of ethical
guidance apart from the Qur'an itself.
The
consisted of two parts: the
isnad, or chain of
—147→
transmission (literally «support»,
«prop»), and the
matn («body» or
«text»). In the words of one scholar, the
would typically adopt the following
formula: «It was related to me by A, on the authority of B, on the
authority of C, on the authority of D, from E (here a companion of Muhammad)
that the Prophet said: '...' -and the
matn would follow (Cragg 537). The
isnad
could of course vary greatly in the number of transmitters. Those cited
included women and men, people of all social strata, the learned and ignorant,
the faithful and heretical. It should also be noted that both writing and
speech were cited as authority: manuscripts could be cited orally and speech
transcribed (Siddiqi, 43-44, 100, 160). The
matn would most often come in the form of an
injunction, proverb, aphorism, brief dialogue or anecdote whose sense might
apply to a range of new contexts, as may be appreciated in Ibn
azm's
Collar de la paloma (174-76).
Zealous concern for the accuracy and authenticity of transmission
is more than understandable given the religious and cultural importance of the
. Interestingly, the practice of attaching
an
isnad to
received discourse extended to other genres of literature and science in
Arabic, including instances of fictive narrative in which authors would record
all the extraneous facts of a story's transmission -who told it to whom, and
where, and so on- before actually telling the story itself (Siddiqi 141-42).
Trivial as some of these instances may be, widespread use of the
isnad
attests to an extraordinary preoccupation with
traditio and to an unusual wariness
with regard to transmitted discourse.
So important was the specificity of transmission that when two
traditions were textually identical but diverged in
isnad,
they were regarded as completely different
(Siddiqi 164). Moreover, because criticism
of the
matn was a delicate matter, nearly the full
force of
criticism fell on the
isnad:
it was a matter of examining the chain of transmission. The most meticulous
chronologies and tens of thousands of biographies were established to determine
not only the whereabouts and contacts of transmitters at different times but
more importantly to judge their character, intentions, memory, social standing
and affiliations in terms of reliability. Techniques of interpreting and
comparing
became extremely refined. The strictest
criteria were thus set up to discern whether any given
was authentic or forged,
«healthy» or «infirm», etc. Ironically, criteria for
authenticity became so acute that any new
conforming to them might for that very
reason be highly suspect; one may surmise that after a while the science of
had to take this paradox into
—148→
account and establish new criteria to detect forgeries that satisfied its old
criteria. Faulty memory, «story-telling» (
), piety at the
expense of truth, heresy, and sectarianism on the part of the transmitters of
were considered principal causes
undermining the validity of traditions (Siddiqi 52-59, 127-29). Hence a
sophisticated discipline emerged whose object of inquiry, regardless of its
specific scope and practical purposes, was nothing other than verbal
transmission and invention.
Under ideal circumstances, the chain of corroboration would
presumably preserve the integrity of the
matn across vast expanses of time: nothing
would be changed in the
matn, no voices would be added to it, no
accents, no traces, no circumstances of telling, except inevitably those of the
most immediate source. A strong link in such a chain would serve as a partial
guarantee of the transmitted words: the stronger the link the less it would
interfere with the message itself. The importance of
who speaks or writes, and
who listens or reads, would ultimately
balance on the crux of reliability, for once this is decided upon, the
isnad
has fulfilled its footnoting function for better or for worse, and the quoted
passage is judged on a linear scale of authenticity. The where, when, how and
why of transmission likewise are mainly of interest to the extent that they
strengthen or weaken the claims of authority implicit in any
. The basic formula for the
isnad of
course suppresses such particulars in favor of a chain of names, and in doing
so it dissolves the verbal and extraverbal context in which the
matn was reportedly quoted. This context, in
which someone previously found the
worth citing and placed it in some wider
discourse or compilation or life circumstance, disappears at every instance of
re-transmission unless the teller or writer deviates from the formula. Thus the
circumstances of reception are effaced at the moment of retransmission.
The bare form of the
isnad
therefore not only serves to authenticate the
as a whole but also, by taking the citation continually
out of context, preserves it as something set within but detachable from the
context in which it was uttered or written, and ensures against any lasting
intervention by discourses or circumstances alien to it. The
isnad
puts many pairs of quotation marks around the
matn without allowing any of these quotation
marks to frame the quoted words with additional text. It presents the
matn as
coextensively quoted time and again, adding
only a name for each communicative event. Discursive levels representing the
sequence of transmissive events may be reconstructed here, but since the
matn is
—149→
taken to be practically
identical at every stage, only a pair of names, those of the addresser and the
addressee, would distinguish one level from another. Previous transmitters are
dispossessed of the discourse in which they cite the tradition, with the result
that the
provided it is thought to be sound, retains
its original authority: the alleged words of the prophet or a witness's account
of his actions come to inhabit the present without bringing with them the many
discursive contexts in which they have been transmitted. The
isnad
thus isolates its citation from much of the refraction that inevitably occurs
when wider discourses enclose it. The transmitters play a sort of guardian's
role with regard to the words they cite: their function is to deliver them
intact, and then disappear; the words themselves come from a source whose
authority they can never attain.
When the
isnad
was believed to be weak or apocryphal, the
as a whole would obviously lose all
credibility and be separated from the canon. The loss of authority nullified
the tradition entirely. The science of
so geared to discovering the reasons why
people invented
, could abandon its investigation at this
point. Understandably, once a
was considered to be fiction, it became
devoid of interest except perhaps insofar as it might aid in detecting other
false traditions.
In most respects, the multiple citation of Cervantes' double
novela behaves very differently from
that of
. Above all, there tends to be an
ever-widening sphere of discursive contexts with each new quotation of a
quotation. An essential part of this expansion involves recontextualizing
others' discourses in one's own, framing them in such a way that they make
sense in new circumstances. Berganza, for example, tells Cipión about
his encounter with la Cañizares both before and after his extensive
citations of her discourse. Campuzano, for his part, tells his friend Peralta
about the dogs before handing him the manuscript of the
Coloquio, which supposedly cites everything
the dogs talked about, and everything they cited. Through this snowballing, or
what I would call
augmentative citation as opposed to
coextensive citation, alleged acts of
communication themselves become part of the narration: tellers, listeners,
writers and readers in turn all become figured within and around the discourse
they have produced as objects of ever new discourses. Those involved in
transmitting
, in contrast, become a string of names
outside the citation (matn).
In the Casamiento / Coloquio, the previous telling becomes told with each citation: discours, while remaining discours with respect to the —150→ language it governs, turns into histoire when objectified by another discourse. Narration becomes a narrated event which in turn becomes the narrated event of a narrated event, and so on to about the ninth power.
Citation temporally aligns communicative events word for word to
produce a complex communicative event. Although a cited discourse belongs to
the past of any framing discourse, citation itself involves transposing the
once here-and-now of the cited discourse into the present here-and-now. Thus
discrete communicative processes belonging to different times are made
simultaneous when represented through direct discourse. As we read la Camacha's
divination, the almost unfathomable time-frames of transmission (or invention),
reception and reference artificially coincide with our own reading time. This
also occurs in the
, except that the
isnad,
by stripping away discursive contexts, all but mutes awareness of intermediate
communicative events and their time-frames.
To complicate matters further, all the basic types of temporal relations between discours and histoire -as defined by Genette- function simultaneously in Cervantes' text (Figures III 228-34). Characters narrate events after they happen, while they happen (e.g., when the dogs speak about what they are doing: speaking), before they happen (e.g., the divination itself), and in the interstices between which they happen. Hence a series of pasts, presents, futures and in-betweens, all projected from different discursive presents, are superimposed one on another. Distinct values and viewpoints of each process of transmission / invention or reception come into play with those of other such processes. For instance, despite his own limited understanding, Berganza takes la Cañizares' already complex understanding of events into account to the extent that his discourse incorporates, allows room for and interacts with her cited discourse. The interplay of understanding within single characters should not be overlooked in this regard: Berganza, as listener to la Cañizares, as teller of his own life-story, and as listener to Cipión, behaves variously according to the three discursive situations.
So much discursive activity means, of course, that an extraordinary number of minds, both real and imaginary, are simultaneously active in the text, engaged in reading, writing, speaking, listening. There is a compounding of minds, each caught in distinct vital circumstances, each viewing things differently, each with its own active memory and sense of anticipation, each involved in communicative activity. Discourse itself becomes highly intensified, transcending —151→ the normal one-word-at-a-time constraints of written and spoken discourse while seeming to conform to them. Though one word follows another on the page, citation provides a means whereby every word becomes many words.
The processes of discourse themselves come into such powerful focus in the Casamiento / Coloquio that they turn into more than a medium of expression: they are to an important extent the object of expression in this novelistic discourse about discourse. Nearly every character draws attention explicitly to the ongoing discourse he or she is engaged in by affirming its truth and accuracy or by expressing criticism, doubts, amazement, etc. At the level of the dogs, in particular, this self-consciousness intervenes and monitors speech at every turn. Such awareness and self-referentiality on the part of characters regarding their own and others' discourse, together with our knowledge that the text we read is being read by a character while the fictitious author sleeps, are bound to make us uncannily self-conscious while reading and perhaps even ontologically giddy.
As one reads Cervantes' deeply orchestrated text, one thus becomes
aware of many processes, chronotopes and viewpoints operant at the same time.
Augmentative citation arranges, condenses and polyphonizes discourse. Readers
are likely to find their attention here and now divided into many elsewheres
and other times in which the discourses and their objects are imagined to take
place. Their divided focus distributes itself unevenly among many discursive
processes, for some of these intrinsically call more attention to themselves
than others. Indeed, as occurs in
, some processes are almost entirely hidden,
such as la Montiela's transcription of the divination. Others stand out
strongly. Among the determining criteria involved here are the extent to which
anyone's discourse focuses on material other than what it cites, the degree to
which any character refers to any other character and his or her discourse, and
the ways in which one discourse sets itself apart from -or integrates itself
with- the discourse it cites. Character groups themselves, made up of (1) the
witches / sorceresses, (2) the dogs and (3) the ensign / licenciate, zone
discourse in their own peculiar ways: each group or pair manifests a social
coherence and shares a worldview -and hence an orientation towards language-
very different from that of the others.
Changes of medium also accentuate contours between one discourse
and another since these set up radically different relationships of
transmission and reception. Again and again
—152→
textuality incribes
orality, which in turn frames textuality by speaking around it and about it. As
in the
there is no inevitable or irreversible
switch from one to the other, though «transmission» does pass
through a definitive textual stage in both the
and the
Casamiento / Coloquio in the form of the
canonical compilations and the
novela, respectively. Yet if there is
one sort of discursive activity that remains in the dark, it is writing. One
sees the results of writing, but there are no witnesses to the activity itself.
When characters in the
novela refer to writing (their own or
others'), they do so in the most shorthand way as though it were a simple act.
Even Cervantes, in his prologue to the
Novelas ejemplares, is remarkably reticent
with regard to the process of writing.
If the simplest act of quotation sets up a two-way relationship between discourses, the interrelationships of multiple citation increase geometrically. Moreover, the discourses in the double novela most often relate to each other through other discourses, whose mediation destabilizes the text to the point of vertigo. Our only access to la Camacha's prophecy is through the language of so many mediators, all of whom necessarily recreate everything they cite.
Qualitatively, too, citation in the Casamiento / Coloquio brings about surprisingly complex relationships due to diverse ways in which discourses interact. I find that in order to characterize these relationships with even minimum adequacy, one has to resort to a wide range of «principles» and metaphors, many of them somehow anthropomorphic: citation is after all one of the most human activities after laughter. Antoine Compagnon, in his resourceful book on citation, invokes a plethora of such metaphors, often in the form of activities -accommodating, working, playing, exchanging, possessing, tailoring, paper-cutting, and many more culled from various fields of action and knowledge -and yet he might be the first to acknowledge the inexhaustibility of metaphors applicable to citation. Here, then, are a few of the ways I would characterize citation in the Casamiento / Coloquio.
Most obviously, as in any act of citation, the quoting discourse
claims to repeat another that has already unfolded. Accordingly, direct
responsibility for the content of the quotation would fall mainly on whoever
wrote or uttered it in the first place. The citer's role would be that of a
conveyor of language to which a distinct mind and voice, distinct circumstances
and intentions, could be assigned. Multiple citation would involve tracing
words back to an originating discourse. This is precisely how citation in
reliable
is regarded.
Yet by taking possession of quoted discourse, the quoter appropriates that other discourse, including it within his or her own as something «other», something exogenous. The quoter defers to the citation, letting it unfold as though intact, preserving its alleged verbal integrity, while the quoting discourse appears to suspend its own internal development. At the same time, however, the quoter contextualizes the citation within his or her own discourse, adding voice and directionality to it and generally yoking it to certain purposes, as Bakhtin has so convincingly argued (e.g., Bakhtin 276-94; Volo inov [and Bakhtin] 228-34). The quoting context orients and infiltrates into the quotation, while the latter finds itself surprised, as it were, in an alien context, mimicked by someone else for an alien audience. It goes without saying that even when words are quoted verbatim, as in Pierre Menard's version of Don Quixote,8 they are by no means the same words as before.
When nonexistent discourses are «cited», as in
unreliable
they become almost pure functions of the
citing discourses, yet retain their exogenous status (a fictive status) through
the convention of attribution, as well as through any internal phenomena (e.g.,
stylistic) that somehow set the quoted discourse apart from the quoting one. In
the
Casamiento / Coloquio, the various
nonexistent discourses of the witches and dogs reveal themselves as exponents
of Campuzano's fiction-making, and his discourse along with everything else in
the double
novela turns out to be an exponent of
another authorial imagination. Each discourse, then, is bounded by linguistic /
ideological markers and by the character to whom it is attributed, yet entirely
infiltrated by intentionalities from «above».
The etymology of the verb to cite -to set in motion- suggests another essential aspect of quotation, that of a dual or multiple process in which a citing discourse revives another and sets it in motion, with the result that all discourses involved necessarily «happen» simultaneously. Such inert terms as «structure», «embedding», «frame» or even «level», though difficult to avoid when talking about citation, tend to deny this movement by spatializing -and to that extent falsifying- the essentially temporal, processual nature of quotation. These terms are of course a misleading legacy of structuralism, which characteristically abstracted process out of —154→ narrative, even when temporality was the object of inquiry; failure to recognize their artificiality and distortion precludes an adequate conceptualization of citation.9 To cite is to be active in discourse and activate another discourse, setting it in motion at the same time as one's own and in the same direction, so to speak. Even the minimal formula of the isnad, often reducible to «A said (qala) that B said that C said...» concatenates simultaneous discursive processes. As I have already suggested, the Casamiento / Coloquio may be seen as a complex event in which discourses mobilize other discourses to their own purposes. How and why they do so is of key importance.
Furthermore, quotation affects authority of discourse. In this
respect, the
and the
Casamiento / Coloquio are poles apart. The
authority of the
, as we have seen, is already immanent in
the attribution of speech to the most authoritative human speaker, the Prophet,
but depends on the reliability of transmitters; when any of these is considered
suspect, the validity of the
as a whole is placed in jeopardy. In the
Casamiento / Coloquio, the founding discourse
is to be found not in what would be the most distant source -la Camacha' s
divination, for example- but rather in the most immediate source, the novels
themselves. Authority and authenticity are completely at odds, though Cervantes
naturally makes use of the conventions of authenticity, of verbal transmission,
as he undermines them.
As sorceresses / witches or as dogs, the first five transmitters of the divination establish one of the most feeble chains of corroboration imaginable: witches and dogs in Cervantes' (and Peralta's) world possess little or no discursive authority. Yet judged according to how they verbalize experience, la Cañizares, Berganza and Cipión would register remarkably high on the scale of reliability despite their self-doubts and close involvement with the events narrated. Where reliability breaks down entirely is in the delirious consciousness of the convalescing Campuzano, who has already in his own tale shown himself to be capable of delusion and thus of fiction-making; the —155→ presence of speaking dogs renders his text even more suspicious. At this point the manuscript of the Coloquio becomes revalued as invention, as artifice, intended for the mind's recreation, as Peralta points out (359). The breakdown of internal authority heightens the reader's awareness of the fictional status of the double novela as a whole.
This collapse is one of
isnad,
since it happens that Campuzano, whether he admits it or not, whether he knows
it or not, has invented the colloquy he claims to have transcribed. Yet
contrary to the transmission and criticism of
, there is also a direct attack on the
matn itself -the divination- as well as on
the sorceress who uttered it, in the form of Cipión's critique. At the
moment of utterance, the divination derives its authority from the proven power
of the sorceress, from the highly specialized language of divinatory verse, and
from the hold it claims to have over the future of Montiela's offspring. Yet
its ambivalent terms and dubious contingency clause render it more than suspect
to Cipión: even if it were to come true, who could ever be sure that it
had done so? After considering implausible figurative and literal
interpretations of the lines, the dog rejects the «text» itself as
malicious nonsense and attributes this to the character and profession of the
sorceress and her colleagues («la Camacha fue
burladora falsa, y la Cañizares embustera, y la Montiela tonta,
maliciosa y bellaca...» -347). Not only here but with each
new speaker and listener, writer and reader, la Camacha's unverifiable
divination loses in prophetic authority and becomes enriched in meaning,
adulterated in intentionality. Citation undermines the prophecy's personal
authority, poetic inviolability and control over the future. Even
Cipión's critique becomes text, undergoing a similar loss of authority
as it is subordinated to alien values and intentions. Through
«transmission» with its widening texts and contexts, speakers and
writers in the
Casamiento / Coloquio lose control of their
own meanings and of their own being as authority dissipates outwards.
Characters are unable to control what happens to their own discourse once
someone else has appropriated it. In particular, Campuzano' s eavesdropping of
discourse not intended for him, as well as his «ghostwriting» of a
text not directly intended for us, demonstrates discursivity getting out of
hand.
Citation figures so insistently in the
Casamiento / Coloquio that it ceases to be
merely a technique: every word in the double
novela somehow resonates from
discursive interplay. Whereas citation in
literature strips away discursive contexts
and strives to retain
—156→
the authority of the transmitted word,
citation in the Cervantine text relativizes, decenters, undermines,
recontextualizes, ironizes, enriches meaning -to mention only a few of its
effects. Any attempt to deal with the complex issues of value and meaning in
the
Casamiento / Coloquio therefore has to take
into account the destabilizing effects of citation -of transmission and
invention, and corresponding reception. For this reason, simple moralistic
statements in the criticism of the
novela tend to fall flat. To deceive
others or oneself, to act hypocritically, to engage in
tropelía (making one thing
appear to be another (337), to participate in witches' Sabbaths, to practice
sorcery, to imagine talking dogs, to dream, to write fiction, to read it -all
of these are
analogous activities in the
novela, some positively and some
negatively charged. I would argue that in the context of the
Casamiento / Coloquio, none of these
important themes can be adequately discussed without reference to their subtle
interaction with the others. This means taking the complex discursive interplay
of the
novela fully into account.
I would further hypothesize that although various episodes in the Casamiento / Coloquio resolve themselves, not one of the many discourses operant at the time that Cipión quotes the prophecy even approaches any kind of resolution. Nor does one discourse solve the problems of another discourse. Although writing may be a therapeutic diversion for Campuzano, his fiction can hardly be said to illuminate his own past or present circumstances. The various communicative encounters end inconclusively and give way to a present as openended as an unfulfilled and suspect prophecy. Augmentative citation contributes to this openendedness, since the recontextualization of discourses revives and reorients them; it predisposes one to view discourse as uncontained and unfinished, as a praxis rather than a product.
The citation of
is also unfinished, since what was once new
(the words and / or deeds of the Prophet) is made new again with each telling.
Indeed, the root of the word,
,
meaning «to happen» (form I) and «to tell a happening»
(form II), points at the same time to a primary event and its renewal through
citation. In order to keep that happening new while externally supporting its
authority, the
isnad
dissolves the intermediate events of citation with all their context, retaining
only the insoluble names of the tellers. Thus, in the case of strong
, the
matn is felt to be both immediate and
verifiable despite the dubious medium of popular transmission over generations.
The
typically allows one to ask what the
Prophet said or
—157→
did, according to whom, and what applicability
this could have to life now. In the
Casamiento / Coloquio, Cervantes pushes the
techniques of citation about as far in the opposite direction as anyone has in
Western literature, showing not their limits but their limitlessness despite
discursive constraints. He exploits one of prose fiction's integral features
and richest resources -citation- and mobilizes it fully in service of the wider
aims of the double
novela. Who, how, why, what for, for
whom: these are some of the questions that emerge most insistently about every
transmissive event. Citation in the
Casamiento / Coloquio accumulates the
circumstantiality of discourses about discourses so as to bring about a
simultaneously mediated discursive process, heightening readers' awareness of
the multiple significance and intentionalities of the words cited. It show how
citing and inventing in the novel are sometimes indistinguishable. It shows,
moreover, how people or characters articulate their own discourses obliquely
through the discourses of others -and how novels cite their own invented
discourses.
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